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Philip Oxhorn
There is a tendency, in both academic research and the public 
imagination, to romanticize about the quality of life within 
communities. Frequently, communities are portrayed as models 
for peaceful, conflict free social relations. This is true particularly 
when such communities are poor or otherwise marginalized, such as 
indigenous people, where the quality of interpersonal relations seems to 
become the last recourse for groups otherwise lacking in resources and 
political influence, harking back to earlier times before the advent of 
colonialism or the impoverishment associated with market economies. 
This is ironic because it implicitly suggests that under what are often 
the worst of circumstances, people can put aside normal human foibles, 
Civil Society from the Inside Out - Community, Organization and the Challenge of Political Influence
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
0
64
 thrive on diversity, reach consensus without significant contention, and 
offer alternatives that will serve as new ideals for the organization of the 
very societies which have dispossessed them of power and influence. 
The experience of a soup kitchen in a Chilean slum during the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in the mid-1980s provides sad 
example of this irony.2 The soup kitchen was one of the oldest in 
Santiago, having emerged in the depths of the economic collapse in the 
early 1980s. It was located in one of the most organized shantytowns, 
with a high level of participation in the social protests that began in 
1983. Over the years, in addition to successfully feeding the families of 
its members, the soup kitchen organized a variety of complementary 
activities for its members, and it was an important actor in the 
larger community. Much of the soup kitchen’s success was directly 
attributable to “Olga,” the elderly widow who founded the soup kitchen 
and became a prominent community leader. 
More generally, the shantytown enjoyed a strong sense of community 
that was reinforced by a number of factors, including the participation 
of different organizations like the soup kitchen in numerous public 
events intended to promote a veritable celebration of the shantytown’s 
collective identity. A shared of history of collective struggle, starting 
with the land seizure that founded the shantytown in the 1950s and 
continuing on through the social protests of the mid-1980s, the 
ubiquitous experience of repression in the midst of poverty, and a 
common “enemy” in the form of the military regime all seemed to 
unite the community vis-à-vis external threats. Dominated by the 
Communist Party (PC), which had organized the land seizure in 1957, 
the shantytown even benefitted from a shared world view regarding 
social justice and the absence of significant political alternatives. In 
other words, as a shantytown characterized by a high level of social 
organization, shared experiences dating back decades, clear common 
interests, and a high level of socioeconomic and political homogeneity, 
it provided a fertile foundation for a strong sense of “community” that 
was encapsulated in and deliberately nurtured by organizations like 
the soup kitchen. 
Despite this, any sense of community was actually quite fragile. 
Political tensions between the PC and other opposition parties began 
to mount with the winding down of the protests in the second half 
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of 1986, resulting in the increasing political marginalization of the 
PC and growing suspicions of organizations associated with it, like 
the soup kitchen. In this context, when a donation from Europe was 
received by the soup kitchen, the sense of “community” quickly began 
to dissolve, as people both participating in the soup kitchen and people 
in the larger community began to question how the money was used. 
The lack of transparency in how the money was spent only added to 
people’s suspicions since it was assumed something was being covered 
up, even though most objective observers familiar with the situation 
found no evidence of wrongdoing.  This, in turn, ultimately led to 
the soup kitchen’s demise and Olga being ostracized by the same 
“community” that she had worked so hard to strengthen.3 Instead of 
further strengthening both the organization and the community which 
it served, the unexpected economic windfall caused the community 
to, in effect, turn on itself. What went wrong?
This article will argue that while the foundation for the inclusionary, 
democratic ideals typified by a romantic view of community can 
be found in many contexts, there is an inevitable tension between 
such ideals, on the one hand, and sources of conflict within 
communities, including the inevitable inequalities associated with 
grassroots participatory experiences more generally, and the danger 
of antagonistic relations with “other” communities, on the other. To 
resolve this tension, I will argue that the ideal of community must 
be analytically separated from the concept of civil society. While the 
two are often seen as synonymous, their relationship can be quite 
problematic in practice. In particular, a strong sense of community is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the existence of civil 
society. Strong communities under some circumstances can actually 
subvert the possibility of a strong civil society, as will be defined in the 
following section.4 Conversely, through the emergence of autonomous 
organizations and an explicit recognition of the centrality of conflict 
in social relations, rather than its denial, civil society’s strength 
ultimately reflects how successfully this tension is resolved. This, in 
turn, determines the capacity of any modern society to achieve the 
ideals of “community.”
The article is organized as follows: after providing a conceptual 
discussion of what civil society is, I turn to an analysis of the dynamics 
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that determine the relationship between civil society and community. A 
third section then discusses how the problematic relationship between 
civil society and communities can be overcome in terms of what I refer 
to as a thin societal consensus and the way in which both civil society 
and communities contribute to the social construction of citizenship. 
In the fourth section, the threat posed by a new pattern of interest 
intermediation, what I define as neopluralism, to both community 
and civil society is explored. The implications of this for democracy 
are discussed in the concluding section. 
Defining Civil Society
A Collectivist Perspective
While most authors would agree that civil society can play a vital 
role in democratization processes, there is still no consensus on what 
that role is, whether it is necessarily a positive one, or even what 
civil society actually consists of. Yet alternative perspectives have 
important implications for understanding the potential of civil society 
to contribute to democratization. This is particularly true when trying 
to understand civil society in Latin America, where both civil society 
and democracy have been historically fragile. Although few would deny 
this historic fragility, there are important disagreements regarding why 
this has been the case, with significant implications for understanding 
the prospects of democracy and civil society in the region. It is therefore 
essential that an appropriate conceptualization of civil society be 
adopted. Two perspectives on civil society tend to dominate the 
literature: a collectivist perspective this article on which this article is 
based, and a more liberal perspective which will be discussed below.
For the purposes of this article, civil society is defined as:
“the social fabric formed by a multiplicity of self-constituted 
territorially- and functionally-based units which peacefully coexist 
and collectively resist subordination to the state, at the same time 
that they demand inclusion into national political structures 
(Oxhorn 1995a, 251-2). 
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This definition reflects a collectivist approach that emphasizes the 
importance of organization and power relations. In particular, strong 
civil societies reflect the capacity of disadvantaged and marginalized 
groups to organize themselves. It is through this autonomous 
organization that groups can define and defend their collective interests 
and priorities in competition with other actors within civil society, 
as well as in interactions between civil society organizations and the 
state.5 This, in turn, implies that civil society has an important role to 
play in promoting more inclusionary democracies (Habermas 1992) by 
demanding respect for both individual and collective rights, (a point I 
will emphasize when discussion the social construction of citizenship 
below),  and that the weakness of civil society in Latin America is both 
a cause and a consequence of the region’s notorious historical problems 
of inequality and socio-economic exclusion. 
It is important to emphasize that while poverty and exclusion 
themselves can be important obstacles to the emergence of strong civil 
societies, it would be a mistake to assume that they are insurmountable. 
This is why a collectivist perspective is essential for understanding 
civil society’s potential. Organization and collective action, by taking 
advantage of the sheer numbers of people who are disadvantaged and 
their shared interests, are the principal resources that potentially are 
at disposal of poor, marginalized groups in order to seek redress for 
their exclusion. For example, organized labor’s demands contributed 
to the emergence of welfare states and democracy in both the North 
and Latin America (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992), much in the same way 
that the emergence of women’s movements across the globe since 
the 1960s have led to the adoption of a myriad of policies promoting 
greater gender equality.6 Without sufficient pressure for change from 
society itself, at best reforms will be partial, creating new forms of 
inequality, and conditional at the discretion of those elites benefiting 
most from the existing structure of society—a point I will return to 
when discussing citizenship.
At the heart of this perspective is the inevitability of conflict in modern 
societies. Societies are too complex and involve such a myriad of 
alternatives and issues that it would be naïve to assume otherwise. 
People have multiple identities and interests, and the strength of civil 
society mirrors this complexity in its own rich mix of organizations, 
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which are both functionally-based (e.g., trade unions) and territorially-
based (e.g., neighborhood councils). Whereas modernization theory 
lauded this multiplicity by implying it led to cross-cutting cleaves, 
consensus and the minimization, if not elimination, of conflict as a 
key driver of politics  (Lipset 1960), the collectivist perspective on civil 
society being espoused here emphasizes the continued importance of 
conflict, particularly in societies marked by high levels of inequality 
and social exclusion. The social fabric that defines strong civil societies 
needs to be diverse to capture the complexities of exclusion and ensure 
that those who are marginalized or disadvantaged have a role to play 
in deciding political outcomes. If “modern” societies thus appear 
to be non-conflictual, it is because of the role civil society plays in 
mediating conflict in relatively peaceful ways, not because conflict 
is absent. “History” never ends (c.f. Fukuyama 1989), but constantly 
evolves as new issues enter public debate and/or new groups organize 
and become politically active. 
Similarly, if conflict is inevitable, its consequences are not. This is 
in part because civil society is an important mechanism for non-
violent conflict resolution. By any definition, violence should be seen 
as antithetical to the norms underpinning civil society. It is a direct 
threat to the autonomy of competing groups, including their very 
existence, whether it be promoted by the state or from within society. 
Whatever the adjective “civil” implies when referring to civil society, 
at a minimum it refers to the recognized right of others to coexist—a 
point I will return to below. Conversely, weak civil societies leave few 
alternatives to tacitly tolerating subordination (i.e., submission) or civil 
war, as societies move toward polarization between those who benefit 
from the status quo and those who are subjected to it—the so-called 
“haves” and “have-nots.” 7  Revolutionary struggles and civil war are 
extreme examples of this. In such cases, organized societal actors can 
be quite strong, particularly in the case of successful revolutions. But 
this is distinct from the kinds of organizations associated with civil 
society. In addition to resorting to violence, such groups have as their 
goal the capture of the state. Such political hegemony is antithetical 
to the conceptualization of civil society used here, since it deliberately 
denies the possibility of competition among different actors for 
political power and, at least in all examples to date, is associated with 
the subordination of society by the state.
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The fact that civil society organizations are self-constituted and enjoy 
a certain level of autonomy vis-à-vis other actors, particularly the state, 
implies that these organizations effectively represent their members.8 
It is this representational dimension that gives these organizations 
legitimacy not only for their respective members, but also for other 
actors. This, in turn, means organizations can be effective interlocutors 
for important segments of a country’s population in relations with other 
civil society actors in the state. Their roots in society and connections 
with their members are a form of power that is difficult to ignore as the 
organization grows in size and/or mobilizational capacity. Conversely, 
other actors can expect that the decisions made by the organization’s 
leadership on behalf of its members will be respected by their members, 
which means that negotiations with such organizations are not only 
worth pursuing, but essential for maintaining social peace.  Weak 
organizations or organizations that exist in name only cannot fill this 
role as interlocutor, undermining civil society’s capacity to mediate 
conflict. This was the challenge the soup kitchen discussed above 
ultimately was unable to meet, despite an impressive track record of 
providing needed goods and services to its community. 
The specific example of the soup kitchen and the inherently 
conflictual nature of civil society provide an important perspective 
on the role of “trust” in civil society. In the case of the soup kitchen, 
people ultimately did not trust Olga—even though one might have 
expected the opposite given her record of community service. In the 
case of civil society more generally, it would seem naïve to assume that 
high levels of trust would exist between groups, recognizing that they 
are likely to disagree on significant issues. This is important because 
if trust is necessary for strong civil society, as many have argued (e.g., 
Almond and Verba 1963), then many developing countries, particularly 
in Latin America (Lagos 1997), cannot even aspire to having a strong 
civil society given very low levels of inter-personal trust. The roots 
of this are less cultural than practical. Years of authoritarian rule 
and repression have taught people that too much “trust” can be 
a dangerous thing.9 In the context of high levels of inequality, the 
contradictory interests of different actors are all the more apparent, 
making trust problematic even in the context of political democracy 
and markedly reduced political repression. 
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Rather than rule out the possibility of a strong civil society, a collectivist 
approach suggests that when trust is absent or, as in the case of the 
soup kitchen, fragile and ephemeral, civil society is most needed. This 
because the organizations that compose civil society can be an effective 
mechanism for limiting the consequences of distrust internally, and for 
mediating relations among various social sectors that do not trust one 
another. As demonstrated by the example of the soup kitchen, growing 
levels of distrust belied what appeared to be a strong organization; the 
soup kitchen could not successfully mediate conflict once it surfaced 
within the organization.  Other actors similarly were unable to help, 
despite the fact that such external assistance, especially from the 
Catholic Church, served as an important facilitator for the growth of 
civil society under the Pinochet dictatorship by providing a variety of 
forms of assistance, including training on conflict mediation (Oxhorn 
1995b).
Ironically, the lack of trust might even provide the best incentive to 
involve oneself in the creation of strong civil society organizations. 
If people are not confident that the decisions made by others will 
reflect their interests, then they have much to gain by organizing to 
demand their inclusion in decision-making processes. This is why 
workers began to organize in the Late 19th and early 20th century, 
and the same could be said for most other civil society organizations 
representing disadvantaged and marginalized groups. Conversely, a 
high level of trust in the decisions of others implies that participation 
would not lead to different outcomes, which obviously would lessen 
the imperative for committing time and other resources to building 
civil society organizations. As Dankwart Rustow (1970, 362)points out 
with reference to democratic transitions, “A people who were not in 
conflict about some rather fundamental matter would have little need 
to devise democracy’s elaborate rules for conflict resolution.” The same 
is perhaps even truer for civil society organizations.
Before discussing community, it is important to examine an alternative 
liberal perspective on civil society.  Drawing its inspiration from 
the work of philosophers John Locke and Alexis de Tocqueville,10 
the liberal perspective is increasingly dominant in the literature. 
“Liberal” societies, principally the United Kingdom and the United 
States, come to represent the ideal of civil society (Seligman 1992), 
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in much the same way that these two cases represent the ideal 
for modernization theories. In sharp contrast with the collectivist 
perspective, civil society is defined in terms of individual rights and 
obligations. Rational individuals who decide to live together to further 
private, individual interests create civil society. Individual freedom 
is valued above all, and this requires the rule of law and respect for 
private property. Membership in any group becomes a function of 
interest maximization. Groups and group identities lose any sense of 
intrinsic value, while the exclusive focus on the individual has meant 
the concomitant marginalization of perspectives focusing more on 
collectivities and group identities, not to mention collective rights. 
Voluntarism and the absence of coercion, in turn, historically have 
justified unequal status by restricting citizenship rights for those who 
are defined as incompetent or dependent (such as women, youths, 
illiterates, indigenous people, the poor and the working class). 
Although it is never very clear how liberal, individualist values become 
predominant, particularly the high levels of interpersonal trust which 
are seen as pivotal in order for people to organize and form vibrant 
civil societies, at a minimum, their presence at the level of society 
is seen as a prerequisite for civil society’s emergence (Almond and 
Verba 1963; Fukuyama 2001; Gellner 1991; Shils 1991). Because of 
the lack of any intrinsic value attributed to group and organizational 
identities stemming from the focus on individuals, an appropriate 
political culture in effect becomes synonymous with civil society itself; 
its absence is seen as precluding civil society’s emergence, while an 
appropriate political culture presumes its existence. 
This focus on the normative dimension of civil society has important 
analytical consequences. The requisites for a highly organized, 
vibrant civil society are actually quite high. This is because the liberal 
perspective deliberately posits a thick notion of the consensual basis 
for civil society’s emergence. Conflict is assumed away because there 
are no fundamental disagreements among citizens living in what are 
seen as “modern” societies. Moreover, this thick consensus is equated 
with a narrow set of Western values and unique cultural experiences. 
For societies that do not share (or necessarily want to share) those 
values and have been victimized by that history, such as most Latin 
American and African countries, or non-Western indigenous cultures 
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emphasizing the collective nature of rights, such a conception of civil 
society is extremely alienating (Hann 1996; Parekh 1992). In fact, 
disputes over competing norms and worldviews that challenge the 
individualism and other values associated with liberal societies are seen 
as anachronistic, more relevant for pre-modern times than the urban 
industrial societies that emerged as the epitome of “development” in 
the West. 
This thick notion of societal consensus is obviously consistent with the 
historical fact that strong civil societies as identified by the collectivist 
perspective have been relatively rare and have been most closely 
associated with the development of Western (and now democratic) 
countries. Viewed this way, civil society would be expected to remain 
more aspirational than real in most contexts. Yet the alleged reasons for 
this are antithetical to a collectivist perspective and deny the centrality 
of conflict for understanding modern politics and civil society’s role. 
In other words, the problem is not that the “bar” for entering what is 
a rather exclusive club is so high, but the way in which that bar is set. 
Conflict, which is essential to understanding the role civil society plays 
from a collectivist perspective, is simply assumed to be non-existent 
in contexts marked by strong civil societies. This is not only irrelevant 
for much of the world, it is ahistorical in its understanding of how 
Western countries themselves developed modern welfare states and 
consolidated democratic regimes. 
Communities and Civil Society
The Ambiguous Link
Ironically, the ideal of a thick social consensus is central to how 
“community” is generally understood. While the nature of the values 
associated with any particular community will be open-ended compared 
to the liberal ideals associated with predominant understandings of 
civil society, only a “community” could hope to enjoy the kinds of 
deep bonds that would unite its members and potentially eliminate 
conflict from everyday social and political life. Whether communities 
are defined geographically, culturally, socially, linguistically, religiously, 
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racially, and/or ethnically, high levels of trust, shared experiences and 
beliefs, the implicit level of homogeneity would serve as the foundation 
for thick social consensus. The irony is that those communities which 
are most likely to live up to this ideal— indigenous, religious, ethnic, 
and linguistic communities, to name just the most obvious—are also 
the same kinds of communities that liberal theorists tend to view as 
anachronistic and increasingly less important in “modern” societies. 
Only when members of such ascriptive groups disassociate themselves 
with those identities, will they be able to consider themselves as 
members of multiple communities, reinforcing the cross-cutting 
cleaves that define modern civil society. This reflects the ways in which 
the liberal perspective denies any intrinsic value for identities, despite 
the fact that they are a primary source of social movement—hence 
civil society—strength in Western societies (Cohen 1985; Melucci 
1989; Oxhorn 1995b). From a liberal perspective, civil society seems 
to have almost an inverse relationship with community, in that the 
stronger communities are, the less likely it will be that civil society at 
a normative level can emerge.  
The reality, however, is more ambiguous. As is the case with a 
liberal perspective on civil society, the general conclusions regarding 
community and civil society at first glance appear to hold some validity; 
some of the most violent conflicts in the world today are communal 
in nature, from Iraq to Sudan. Nevertheless, the reasons for this from 
a liberal perspective are mistaken. Communities with exceptionally 
strong bonds among their members can be either building blocks 
for civil society, or obstacles to its growth. Recent experiences with 
indigenous movements (Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005) and religious 
groups associated with both the progressive Catholic Church and 
more conservative Christian Evangelical movements in Latin America, 
parts of Asia and Africa (Lehmann 1990, 1996; Oxhorn 1995b) 
show the contribution “communities” can make to democratization 
processes. The role communities will play in relation to civil society will 
depend on several factors, particularly the mechanisms for achieving 
consensus within the community and the consequences this has for 
the community’s relations with other social actors and the state.
As the example of the soup kitchen highlights, no community is 
inherently conflict free. The bonds that unite them can be ephemeral, 
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belying any strong sense of shared or common interest. Moreover, 
members of communities are not equal, no matter how egalitarian the 
structure is intended to be. Natural abilities, including the ability to 
express oneself clearly and leadership skills, mean that some members 
will inevitably have more influence than others (Mansbridge 1980). 
This, in turn, can reflect how “communities” address (or fail to 
address) differences amongst their members along race, gender, and 
social class, to name but the most obvious (Burdick 1992). Focusing 
on one identity, ignoring sources of friction and discrimination felt by 
members, and/or assuming sources of difference are unproblematic, 
means that communities can be almost unbelievably narrow in their 
outlook and activities. Any semblance of unity and consensus is then 
artificial, as people feel excluded from the community despite no 
obvious obstacle to their participation.11 
One mechanism for maintaining such artificial consensus is to 
accentuate conflicts with other communities, reinforcing community 
bonds in order to resist the threat that outsiders are seen to represent. 
Manipulated by self-serving elites in pursuit of political power, this 
exacerbates the fragmentation of larger societies as a whole and the 
parochialism that is inevitably a by-product of an exclusively local focus. 
Rather than build strong civil societies, such dynamics have turned 
communities against one another and the state, feeding the kinds of 
communal conflicts that lead to violence, if not civil war.  The recent 
experience of ethnic violence in Kenya during its 2007 presidential 
elections, not mention the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda’s genocide, are only the most extreme examples of this.
 While such violence is sometimes viewed as the consequence of a civil 
society that has become too strong (Berman 1997; Foley and Edwards 
1996), the real problem is civil society’s weakness (Oxhorn 2006). 
Strong societies, as evidenced by the strength of their organizations, 
including possibly their capacity to engage in armed struggle, are not 
civil society. This is because civil society mediates conflict rather than 
deliberately accentuates it. It is the lack of the mediating structures 
that civil society entails, both within and among communities, which 
generates these destructive dynamics. In other words, they epitomize—
often with dramatic consequences—the failure of civil society. In such 
circumstances, societies tend to polarize and, in the worst cases, the 
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ascriptive communities that could, under appropriate circumstances, 
serve as the building blocks of strong civil societies, threaten to tear 
apart the larger societies in which they are found. 
A good example of this conceptual problem is found in Sherri Berman’s 
(1997) discussion of the collapse of Weimar Germany and the rise of 
Hitler. As she demonstrates, it was the ability of the National Socialist 
German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) to use the organizations of civil 
society that ultimately enabled it to win electoral power. Yet it was the 
weakness of those organizations and their inability to represent the 
interests of their members that was responsible for the ability of the 
NSDAP to do this. The vacuum created by what was effectively the 
collapse of civil society meant that an organizational space was left 
behind for a totalizing party to fill, which the NSDAP was particularly 
adept in doing. In this example, as well as many others, the thick 
consensus associated with communities becomes the project of key 
political actors on a national scale, making compromise increasingly 
impossible and forcefully limiting the participation of competing 
communities at the national level, if not eliminating them altogether.
Ultimately, community and civil society are not only distinct concepts, 
but they are also potentially complementary ones. The normally high 
levels of trust found among community members and their shared 
history and experiences has much to offer in the quest for inclusive 
democratic government. But trust is not the same as agreement, and 
shared histories and experiences are open to differing interpretations, 
even as they can serve as a foundation for fruitful dialogue. Although the 
existence of civil societies is not dependent on these or other attributes 
of communities, their presence can definitely facilitate the emergence 
of the kinds of autonomous organizations that could collectively form 
a strong civil society. Civil society then becomes a mechanism for 
mediating conflict and ensuring the interests and priorities of the 
people who different organizations represent are taken into account. 
In this sense, “community” is a pre-political manifestation of collective 
identity, and communities require organization to enter the political 
realm. The political importance of specific communities will be 
determined by the kind of organization adopted, and the organizations 
composing civil society represent one way for communities to achieve 
this. 
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Finally, it is important to note that organizations that are not based on 
community are also central to understanding civil society’s potential. 
Functional organizations such as labor movements play a critical role 
in representing and defending the rights of marginal groups, historically 
having contributed to the expansion of rights and the modern welfare 
state (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). Functional organizations—defined in 
terms of what they seek to achieve independently of their geographical 
basis—have similarly played an important role in advancing the interests 
of groups when community-based organizations prove insufficient, 
and may even be obstacles. This is clear in the case of women. While 
women generally play important roles in community organizations, the 
constraints imposed on their activity by patriarchy and traditional gender 
roles has invariably led them to create separate women’s organizations to 
advance gender equality more broadly. Functional organizations can also 
facilitate the growth of movements based on communal identities, in 
effect blurring the distinction between functional and territorially-based 
organizations. In Bolivia, for example, organized labor played a central 
role in the rise of the indigenous movements that would transform 
citizenship in Bolivia with the election of Evo Morales in 2005. This was 
the first time that Bolivia had an Indigenous president, despite the fact 
that a majority of the population was Indigenous. Among other things, 
Morales oversaw the implementation of a new constitution, formally 
declaring that Bolivia was now a plurinational state.12 
Civil Society, Community and the Social Construction 
of Citizenship13
The immediate effect of this ambiguous relationship between 
community and civil society can be understood in terms of what it 
means to be a “citizen” in a given society. More specifically, the conflicts 
that civil society helps mediate are reflected in the social construction of 
citizenship. As Tilly, (1996, 9) notes, historically, it was the “struggle and 
bargaining between expanding states and their subjects [that] created 
citizenship where it had not previously existed.” Even today, when there is 
perhaps greater agreement than ever before on the normative content of 
democratic citizenship rights, there is still no consensus for implementing 
many specific rights of citizenship. In most new democracies, conflicts 
over basic citizenship rights were central yet unresolved issues in the 
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transition process. The failure of democratic institutions to address these 
shortcomings after the transition is often the principal source of their 
fragility. The pressures for expanding citizenship rights that emerge (or 
fail to emerge) from within civil society, and how those pressures are 
dealt with by the state, are central to any causal theory of citizenship. In 
other words, citizenship reflects which groups participate in their social 
construction and how. In this way, the strength of civil society is mirrored 
in the scope and depth of citizenship rights.
In sharp contrast to the thick social consensus associated with the 
liberal perspective on civil society, the starting point for understanding 
the social construction of citizenship is a thin or minimal social 
consensus. Such a consensus has two components. First, relevant actors 
in a given society recognize that they are members of a geographically 
defined unit associated with some sense of “public good,” even if there 
are sharp disagreements over what that public good entails. Such 
acceptance may be normative (e.g., a shared national identity) or the 
result of a lack of alternatives (e.g., secession is not feasible due to 
external resistance or viable due to a lack of resources). Second, the 
right of other social actors to compete for political influence in the 
definition of that public good without threat of violence is accepted. 
This may be for normative reasons, or because the inability of any one 
actor to dominate the others means violence will only end in stalemate. 
Once again, at first glance, the outcome may appear consistent with 
a liberal perspective. But the reasons are fundamentally distinct. 
They are related to continued conflict, the lack of consensus and the 
impossibility of succeeding through violent means rather than any 
rejection of violence. In other words, actors—including the state—
perceive that they have no alternative than to “agree to disagree.” As 
noted above, the resultant lack of trust then can become a principal 
motivating factor for continued involvement in civil society, if only to 
help ensure that group interests are respected.
The latter point highlights another important distinction between 
collectivist and liberal perspectives. Rights are inevitably an outcome of 
collective struggle. Indeed, it is the reluctance of elites to grant rights 
in the first instance that requires collective action to pressure them 
into doing so (Oxhorn 2003). Whether it be civil rights such as the 
right to organize and express dissent, the right to vote or cultural, social 
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and economic rights, their existence both on paper and in practice is 
linked intrinsically to the capacity of disadvantaged groups to effectively 
demand them. Moreover, the collective nature of these struggles belies 
the incompatibility of collective rights with other rights associated with 
citizenship. This is because the rights, once won, often apply to ascriptive 
categories of citizens, such as workers, women, sexual identity, the elderly, 
youth, and so on.  From a collectivist perspective, the dichotomy between 
Western, individual rights and non-Western collective rights is a false 
one. It is a contingent relationship, reflecting national social structures 
and the social construction of citizenship in distinct contexts.
The process of state-civil society interaction leads to different models 
of citizenship. The dominant citizenship model in Latin America was 
citizenship as cooptation. It was closely associated with industrialization 
and urbanization, starting early in the 20th century in a number of 
countries. 
The cornerstone of citizenship as cooptation was a unique process of 
controlled inclusion (Oxhorn 2003). Controlled inclusion consisted of 
top-down processes of political and social inclusion in which citizenship 
rights were segmented, partial and, ultimately, precarious. Rather than 
substantially alter structures of inequality, it both reflected and reinforced 
them. Controlled inclusion was a state project intended to mediate the 
threat posed by organized subordinate classes through their selective 
and partial incorporation, severely restricting the scope and autonomy 
of civil society through policies of state corporatism, clientelism and 
populist appeals that were made possible by the resources placed at the 
disposal of political elites as a by-product of rapid economic growth. 
Ultimately, controlled inclusion belied the existence of strong civil 
societies; only select segments of society were allowed to organize 
and the autonomy of those organizations was seriously compromised. 
Important social rights of citizenship were often granted in lieu of 
meaningful political rights, while the authoritarian nature of the 
regime by definition implied that respect for basic civil rights was 
precarious at best.14
The model of citizenship as cooptation generally began to break down 
in the 1970s and 1980s. This reflected the limits of the region’s import 
substitution development model and the debt crisis of the early 1980s. 
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It was also reflected the fact that citizenship as cooptation co-existed 
with a competing citizenship model, citizenship as agency. Citizenship 
as agency reflects the active role that multiple actors, particularly those 
representing disadvantaged groups, must play in the social construction 
of citizenship for democratic governance to realize its full potential. 
It is synonymous with strong civil societies in Western Europe, where 
advanced social welfare states can be seen as one of this model of 
citizenship’s principal achievements. Given Latin America’s historical 
extremes of inequality and exclusion, the Left typically championed 
the ideal of citizenship as agency. When a citizenship as agency model 
threatened to predominate, military coups were often the result. 
Today, the dichotomy of citizenship as agency and citizenship as 
cooptation has lost its centrality to a new model of citizenship: citizenship 
as consumption. Citizens are best understood as consumers, spending 
their votes and often-limited economic resources to access what normally 
would be considered minimal rights of democratic citizenship. 
Citizenship as consumption is closely related to a market-centered 
mode of political incorporation and social integration, neopluralism. 
The political criteria for inclusion associated with controlled inclusion 
(social control and loyalty) are replaced by economic ones. While 
closely associated with neoliberal economic policies, it is not reducible 
to any specific set of economic policies or correlated with any particular 
the level of economic liberalization. 
The pluralist aspect of neopluralism reflects a normative belief that the 
best balance of interests and values within a given polity is produced 
by some form (however limited) of free competition among individuals 
in the rational pursuit of their selfinterest. Ultimate political authority 
is determined through a free a market of votes. Individual freedom 
is valued above all, and this requires respect for private property and 
(ideally, at least) the rule of law. 
What distinguishes neopluralism from the more traditional pluralist 
model associated with democracy in the United States is its marked 
authoritarianism. While it is important that the people who govern 
are elected, once elected, they have few checks on their power. 
They frequently bypass and deliberately undermine representative 
democratic institutions (O’Donnell 1994). Moreover, unelected power 
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holders, particularly the military and “de facto powers” including 
dominant economic interests, exercise control over key state decisions 
(Garretón 2003). 
The logic of neopluralism permeates entire political systems in a 
variety of ways. Market-based incentives come to play a defining role 
in collective action. An individual’s personal economic resources largely 
determine the extent and nature of her political and social inclusion. 
One’s economic resources also directly affect the quality of education, 
health care and even the legal protection a person enjoys. Just as the 
state is assigned a minimal role in ensuring the smooth functioning of 
the market in the economic realm, the state largely abdicates its role in 
providing incentives. The public and private goods formally available at 
the state level to those mobilized in earlier periods, as well as the coercive 
incentives for the hierarchical organization of economic interests under 
state corporatism, no longer exist or have been significantly reduced. 
Group identities and collective interests lose any intrinsic value, yet 
these are a primary potential source of power for subaltern groups. 
Neopluralism, Community and Civil Society15
Neopluralism poses a unique threat to both community and civil 
society. This is because neopluralism  is closely associated with rising 
economic inequality and economic insecurity, criminal violence, 
limited possibilities for social mobility, and a crisis of representation 
reflected in the growing disillusionment with political parties and 
key democratic institutions throughout the region (Oxhorn 2011). 
At the level of civil society, state reforms that weaken the institutions 
regulating markets and that have the potential to redistribute income 
progressively, as well as other reforms that undermine the ability of 
workers to organize, contribute to this.  The growing economic and 
physical insecurity people face, combined with the sense that political 
elites simply do not care, similarly combine to lower the incentive, 
if not capacity, for people to organize. Instead, they are increasingly 
concerned with their daily existence—a problem especially acute for 
poor, disadvantaged groups. Ultimately, civil society becomes atomized, 
losing its capacity to resolve conflict and represent disadvantaged groups.
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These same dynamics, in turn, impact communities in contradictory 
ways. For indigenous communities, they can provide the opportunity 
to organize at the national level, successfully demanding new rights, 
particularly regarding cultural and linguistic recognition (Yashar 
2005). More generally, the stress such dynamics create can lead to 
new forms of collective innovation at the community level (Burdick 
et al. 2009). Yet at the same time, such positive trends are still quite 
incipient, and have had a mixed record at best in terms of reversing 
the fundamental challenges for civil society and communities 
represented by neopluralism. This is especially true when looking 
beyond the level of the relatively small communities in which they 
emerge (Oxhorn 2009a). Even in the case of successful indigenous 
movements, their achievements, which are undeniably of tremendous 
historical importance, particularly in Bolivia where an indigenous 
president has transformed the constitutional structure of the state, 
it is still not clear what this means in terms of economic and social 
empowerment, inequality and poverty alleviation. 
The ultimate danger is that in the perverse socio-economic and 
political context created by neopluralism, communities will turn in 
on themselves, contributing to a disintegration of national social 
fabrics without providing satisfactory alternatives. As states retreat, the 
definition and pursuit of public goods becomes an increasingly local 
matter, reinforcing inequality and marginalization as communities try to 
survive. At their worst, these threatened communities could ultimately 
turn on other communities in a spiral of violence as they look for 
scapegoats and/or access to resources.16 To take one of the most extreme 
examples, this is precisely what happened in the Weimar Republic, 
paving the way for victory of fascism in its most extreme form. The 
alternative is the strengthening of communities through their mutual 
reinforcement as the foundation for the emergence of strong, inclusive 
democratic regimes based on a thin yet realistic societal consensus.  
The Quest for Inclusive Democratic Governance
Community, Civil Society and the State
The threat posed by neopluralism to both civil society and communities 
ultimately serves to highlight the importance of state-society relations 
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as a process in which civil society plays a decisive role in determining the 
extent and nature of democratic inclusion. Communities are central 
to this as well, but their relation to civil society similarly determines 
their role. Whether communities contribute to the strengthening of 
civil society and, as a result, democratic governance, will depend on 
a number of factors, of which organization and autonomy are central 
concerns.
Citizenship offers a useful lens for understanding these relations. 
Whether it be through citizenship as cooptation or citizenship as 
consumption, civil society is severely circumscribed. In these cases, 
communities face numerous challenges, included fragmentation and 
manipulation by elites in the pursuit of their own self-interest. Civil 
society, as understood from a collectivist perspective, provides the tools 
to avoid both, contributing to the strength of communities and their 
capacity to enrich democratic processes.
In the end, the problem is not social conflict, but the way in which 
it is mediated. Ignoring it or pretending that it has been eclipsed 
by modernity only risks perpetuating exclusion and ultimately the 
collapse of democratic institutions. While there are alternative ways for 
mediating conflict, the argument advanced here is that only civil society 
can do so in a way that supports inclusive democratic governance, at 
the same time that it fortifies the true strengths of communities in 
positive ways. As the sad history not of only of colonialism in the global 
South attests, but also the processes by which modern nation states 
in Western Europe and North America were created, this is the only 
way to preserve the true meaning of community. 
NOTES
1. Many of the ideas expressed in this section are developed in greater 
detail in Oxhorn (2011). A Spanish version of this article will appear 
in the Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas.
2. The following is based on fieldwork undertaken by the author in 
Santiago, Chile, 1984-7.
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3.  In fact, Olga was so ashamed of what happened to her that she refused 
to meet with me in subsequent trips to the shantytown.
4. As will be discussed in a following section, the failure to draw these 
distinctions has led some authors (e.g., Berman 1997; Foley and 
Edwards 1996) to mistakenly conclude that “civil society” can be the 
source of extremes of social violence when, upon closer examination, 
the source of the violence is actually the weakness of civil society. This 
weakness creates a representational vacuum within societies that is 
ultimately taken advantage of by actors that have more in common 
with communities that have become too strong than civil society. 
5. It is important to emphasize that civil society organizations, particularly 
in developed democracies, frequently interact with their respective 
states at the local, subnational and national levels. Autonomy in 
this sense refers to the ability of civil society organizations to define 
and defend their collective dealings with the state, even when—as 
is frequently the case—they receive material assistance from states. 
Conversely, when civil society organizations do not interact with the 
state, they risk political marginalization, if not irrelevance.
6. Not surprisingly, similar arguments against the romanticizing 
communities can be found in feminist theory. See for example, the 
work of Seyla Benhabib (1992; 2002), among others. While this 
literature undoubtedly would enrich the arguments being made here, 
it is beyond the scope of the article to discuss them at length. I thank 
one of the anonymous reviewers for reminding me of this important 
point.
7. While still inclusive, the increasing social mobilization around 
inequality that began with the Occupy Movement in the US is a 
good example of the beginnings of a civil society reaction to growing 
problems of inequality in advanced market economies, particularly 
after the Great Recession of 2008. Earlier examples would in the Civil 
Rights and Anti-War movements in the US, as well as various other 
identity-based new social movements, particularly in Western Europe. 
For example, see Melucci (1985).
8. As understood here, issues of representation are empirical rather than 
theoretical. On the one hand, organizations that created to access and/
or distribute resources or provide a platform of individuals are not 
really civil organizations in this sense. For this reason, most NGOs are 
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not civil society organizations, although they can plan an important 
role in facilitating the growth of civil society organizations, much like 
the Catholic Church did during periods of military rule. See Oxhorn 
(1995b). On the other hand, civil society organizations that fit this 
definition may be small or large, politically influential or marginalized, 
weak or strong, and so-on, depending on the size of their membership 
and various obstacles that might exist to their participation in larger 
social and political processes. Such obstacle could include violence, 
racism and other negative social conditions in any particular case.
9. This was a particular problem for me in trying to do ethnographic 
research in Chile in the 1980s. As an outsider (particularly an 
American one), I was automatically suspect. Such suspicions were 
only reinforced by the regime’s use of informants who, like me, wanted 
to learn as much as possible about civil society organizations in the 
shantytowns, and the harsh experience of repression after the 1973 
coup. To overcome this, I literally had to earn their trust. See Oxhorn 
(1995b).
10. The collectivist perspective adopted here  owes more to the work of 
Montesquieu. See Taylor (1990).
11. As Burdick (1992) shows in his study of religious organizations in 
Brazilian urban slums, such outcomes may be quite surprising. 
Progressive liberation theology in practice was actually quite 
exclusionary within poor communities. In part, this was because 
active participation requires a certain level of literacy to read and 
interpret the Bible, as well as an ability to articulate oneself effectively 
in group discussions. At the same time, Liberation Theology’s links 
with social transformation emphasized the class nature of society, 
assuming that more economic equality would resolve problems caused 
by racism, gender inequality, and so on. Conversely, the requirements 
for participation in more conservative Evangelical groups were 
considerably lower—one merely had to believe. The strength of such 
beliefs, however, was associated with reductions in family violence, 
drug abuse and other real problems in peoples, day-to-day lives. 
Moreover, people were accepted regardless of their gender or skin color.
12. It is also worth noting that Morale’s national success was based 
on the successful organization of a new political movement, the 
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). The movement transformed 
local community identity into a national force, reversing centuries 
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of indigenous peoples’ marginalization. As part of civil society, the 
MAS continued to help mediate conflict, both between the new 
indigenous movement and other civil society actors, as well as among 
the functional and territorially based organizations that sought 
representation through it.
13. The following is a revised version of Oxhorn (2009b).
14. Following the seminal work of T.H. Marshall (1950), this analysis looks 
at three categories of rights: civil (freedom of speech and to organize, 
legal due process, etc.), political (the right to vote), and social (rights 
associated with the modern welfare state). The analysis can also be 
extended to other categories of rights, thereby overcoming a principal 
critique of Marshall’s more limited conceptualization. See Oxhorn 
(2011).
15. The arguments presented here are developed is much greater detail 
in Oxhorn (2011). It is important to note that at least some aspects 
of my argument are applicable outside of Latin America, while some 
countries—most notably Bolivia—appear to have overcome the crisis 
of representation as the emergence of new social actors displaced more 
traditional political parties.
16. Fortunately, such extreme tendencies have been largely contained in 
Latin America, although to a certain extent regional struggles in Bolivia 
in the years immediately following Evo Morales election pointed in 
this direction until compromise was eventually achieved. Many African 
countries, however, have not been so fortunate.
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AbstrAct 
Civil Society from the Inside Out. Community, 
Organization and the Challenge of Political Influence
There is an inevitable tension between the ideals associated with the 
concept of community and multiple sources of conflict within them. 
To resolve this tension, the ideal of community is analytically separated 
from the concept of civil society, which is defined from a collectivist 
perspective that emphasizes the importance of organization and power 
relations. In particular, strong civil societies reflect the capacity of 
disadvantaged and marginalized groups to organize themselves, thereby 
helping to peacefully mediate social conflict. The ways in which civil 
society helps mediate conflict are reflected in three models of citizenship: 
citizenship as cooptation, citizenship as agency, and Citizenship as 
consumption. The latter model of citizenship is increasingly common 
in Latin America and threatens both communities and civil society more 
generally through its close association with rising economic inequality 
and economic insecurity, criminal violence, limited possibilities for social 
mobility, and a crisis of representation throughout the region. The article 
concludes by highlighting the importance of state-society relations as 
a process in which civil society plays a decisive role in determining the 
extent and nature of democratic inclusion. Communities are central to 
this as well, but their relation to civil society similarly determines their 
role. Whether communities contribute to the strengthening of civil 
society and, as a result, democratic governance, will ultimately depend 
on whether their true strengths are fortified in positive ways.
resumen 
La Sociedad Civil por dentro y por fuera. Comunidad, 
organización y el desafío de la influencia política
Existe una tensión inevitable entre los ideales asociados con el concepto 
de comunidad y las múltiples fuentes de conflicto en su interior. A fin 
de resolver esa tensión, el artículo separa analíticamente el ideal de la 
comunidad del concepto de sociedad civil, definido este último desde 
una perspectiva colectivista que pone énfasis en la importancia de la 
organización y las relaciones de poder. En particular, las sociedades 
civiles fuertes reflejan la capacidad de los grupos desfavorecidos y 
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marginalizados para organizarse, ayudando a mediar pacíficamente 
en el conflicto social. La sociedad civil actúa como mediadora en el 
conflicto siguiendo tres modelos de ciudadanía: ciudadanía como 
cooptación, ciudadanía como intermediación y Ciudadanía como 
consumo. El último modelo de ciudadanía es cada vez más común 
en América Latina y amenaza tanto a las comunidades en particular 
como a la sociedad civil en general a través de su estrecha asociación 
con la creciente desigualdad e inseguridad económica, los delitos 
violentos, las limitadas posibilidades de movilidad social y la crisis 
de representación presente en toda la región. El artículo concluye 
destacando la importancia de las relaciones estado-sociedad como 
proceso en el que la sociedad civil desempeña un papel decisivo al 
momento de determinar el alcance y la naturaleza de la inclusión 
democrática. Las comunidades también tienen una importancia 
central en este sentido pero, del mismo modo, es su relación con la 
sociedad civil lo que determina su rol. La posible contribución de las 
comunidades al fortalecimiento de la sociedad civil y, por consiguiente, 
de la gobernanza democrática, dependerá en última instancia de si 
sus fuerzas genuinas salen fortalecidas positivamente. 
summArio 
A Sociedade Civil por dentro e por fora. Comunidade,  
organização e o desafio da influência política
Existe uma tensão inevitável entre os ideais associados com o conceito 
de comunidade e as múltiplas fontes de conflito em seu interior. Com 
o propósito de resolver essa tensão, este artigo separa analiticamente 
o ideal da comunidade do conceito de sociedade civil, este último 
definido de uma perspectiva coletivista que enfatiza a importância da 
organização e as relações de poder. Em particular, as sociedades civis 
fortes refletem a capacidade de organização dos grupos desfavorecidos 
e marginalizados, o que ajuda a mediação pacífica do conflito social. 
A sociedade civil atua como mediadora no conflito seguindo três 
modelos de cidadania: cidadania como cooptação, cidadania como 
intermediação e cidadania como consumo. Este último modelo de 
cidadania é cada vez mais comum na América Latina e ameaça tanto 
as comunidades, em particular, quanto a sociedade civil, em geral, 
por meio de sua estreita associação com a crescente desigualdade e 
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insegurança econômica, os crimes violentos, as limitadas possibilidades 
de mobilidade social e a crise de representação presente em toda a 
região. O artigo conclui destacando a importância das relações estado-
sociedade como processo no qual a sociedade civil desempenha um 
papel decisivo no momento de determinar o alcance e a natureza da 
inclusão democrática. As comunidades também têm uma importân-
cia central para isto. Do mesmo modo, porém, é a sua relação com a 
sociedade civil o que determina o seu papel. A possível contribuição 
das comunidades para o fortalecimento da sociedade civil, e, em conse-
quência, da governança democrática, dependerá, em última instância, 
do enriquecimento de suas forças genuínas.
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